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For the past three years, the writer has been closely associated with
the field of budgeting in the United States Navy. He has participated in the
process of budgeting at nearly all levels, including the formulation and exe-
cution of budgets at the levels of the field activity and the Navy Department,
and the justification of budgets to Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart-
ment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget and,
finally, to the Congressional sub-committee on appropriations for the Navy.
While experience obtained in formulating budgets at the field level
has been the most useful from an operating standpoint, the experiences gained
at the Departmental level have, by far, proved to be the most educational
from the standpoint of gaining some knowledge of the "facts of life" about
budgeting as applied to the Military, in general, and the Navy, in
particular.
Most of the processes noted have evolved through much careful
thought and a great deal of trial and error—through the medium of experience
in meeting the multiple demands of, and or, those who must approve the
budgets and appropriate the monies called for by those budgets. However, it
is firmly believed that the many pressures upon the present processes tend
to dilute the efforts of the Military, et al, toward realistic financial
planning; it is about these pressures, and associated problems, that the
ensuing paper is written with the goal in mind of recognizing some things
known, or believed by many to exist, but about which little has been written.
The writer is indebted to the United States Navy for his present
ii

opportunity to set aside his regular duties and study a matter which has inter-
n-
ested him for some time.
All of the views expressed in the following pages are solely those of




BACKGROUND TO CURRENT MILITARY BUDGET PRACTICE
Introduction
The objective of the study which ensues is to highlight several of the
pressures and problems which are believed to be inherent in the arduous task of
producing a Military Budget, with particular reference to the United States
Navy. The development of budgeting techniques in the Military has been mete-
oric since the close of World War II, and especially since the advent of the
Performance Budget*, established pursuant to the studies and recommendations of
the Hoover Commission*'.
At this point, it is appropriate to remind the reader that the present
trend in Federal budget methods does not represent the first effort of Congress
to bring about increasingly minute examination of the details of costs.
Earlv Budget Experiences Between
the Congress and the Military
Many of the early encounters between the Congress and the Military over
budgetary matters stemmed from the practice of comingling unused balances of
appropriations. Albert Gallatin-*, one of the early proponents of detailing of
*U.S. Congress, House. F.L. 216, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 5632,
National Security Act. Amendments of 1949 . August 10, 1949. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1949.
U.S. Government. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security Organization. January
1949 . Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1949.
^Lucius Wilmerding, The Spending Power (New Haven: Tale University
Press, 1943), pp. 33-49.

costs and restricted use of appropriations, was at constant odds over that prin-
ciple with Oliver Wblcott, Jr., Alexander Hamilton ! s successor as Secretary of
the Treasury. Then, as now, the overwhelmingly largest portion of the Federal
budget was for military appropriations. Unscheduled demands on the Military re-
sulted in Executive decisions to use appropriations for purposes other than for
which approved by Congress. Wblcott favored considering appropriations as
general funds while Gallatin resolutely fought for appropriation language such
3, "...shall be solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively
appropriated. "^
Despite opposition, such as expressed in the foregoing paragraph, there
have been repeated instances through the years since the inception of the Federal
budget when high Government officials have, in the National interest, approved
expenditures of public funds in advance of Congressional approval, invoking the
doctrine of Salus Populi as justification for the acts. Unfortunately, however,
due to military crises, the largest percentage of such transactions have in-
volved military appropriations, and the ensuing arguments over the propriety of
the actions have reacted upon the Military, at times the more or less innocent
bystander to the proceedings. Repeated instances of these and other disputes
have had a cumulative effect on relations between Congress and the Military and,
at least, have had indirect effects on other budgetary dealings with Congress.
The residue of suspicion from these and other encounters carries down to the
present day.
Many of the earlier financial actions by the Navy were severely criti-
cized, among the most censurable of which was the tortuous interpretation by
the Navy of the rule governing lapsing of appropriations. The rule specified
Ibid., pp. 42, tf.
tilJS
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that balances remaining In the Treasury would lapse to the Surplus Fund after
two years. This rule was circumvented by the ruse of withdrawing the Treasury
balance by warrant and redepositlng the warranty thereby establishing the Navy's
own balance with the Treasurer of the United States. With such reserves, the
Navy could supplement current appropriations, as desired.
Legislative Trends in Military Budgeting
The practice described in the foregoing paragraph was brought to light
as early as 1795^-, and led to the invoking by Congress of closer restrictions
on the 1797 appropriation bill. However, loose practices continued and brought
on several other restrictions imposed by the Appropriation Act of 1820, no less
a personage than Henry Clay leading the support for such restrictions. However,
general laxity continued unabated until 1868, when Congress first voted punitive
measures into the Appropriation Act2 in an effort to obtain conformance to its
desires.
These are but fragmentary highlights of a history of ebb and flow in the
temper of Congress in its efforts to express its desires in legislation designed
to control the appropriation and expenditure of public funds. There were many
ensuing cycles of alternate periods of virtual disinterest and acute preoccupa-
tion In the manner in which the executive agencies handled their money. There
were strong proponents of a school of thought which was reluctant to impose any
restrictions on the Executive, even to the extreme of permitting a carte blanche
to incur expenditures a priori the appropriation of funds. The noble purposes
which these gentlemen pursued were generally laudable in Intent, but in far too
many Instances, were distorted in practice by those administering the funds in
1Ibid . . p. 42.
2U.S. Congress, House. 40th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 14, Appropriation Act
OF 1868 . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868.

uthe executive agencies. Nevertheless, the moments of these cycles gradually nar-
rowed toward the practices of the present day, due mainly to the efforts of the
proponents of the opposite extreme of thought—acute restriction. The extreme
points of view were mitigated by the temperate and levelling force of those who
desired that both the letter and intent of the law be observed—that indeed, the
doctrine of Salus Populi applied at times—that Congress could not always legis-
late before the fact of need, or in stultifying detail such as to tie the hands
of the Executive Department.
The Advent of the Business Man
in the Military
The cumulative efforts of Congress to bring about adequate controls over
the public purse have been largely due to the interest of a few, some skilled in
the intricacies of finance through experience in the field of business, and
others, merely interested. Of all of the representatives in Congress, at any
given time, there are few indeed who are really informed on budgetary matters,
and, of these, even fewer who understand adequately, in detail, what they are
informed about. Nevertheless, their cumulative efforts over the past decades
have brought us to the present, vastly improved, system of financial controls.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended in 1939, at last provided a
basic machinery with which it was made feasible to establish organized financial
control. Up to 1921,alabyrinth of legislation, Executive Orders, and individual
executive agency administrative procedures provided a completely uncoordinated
basis for the expenditure of public funds. The Act of 1921, while in itself in-
adequate, was a great, single legislative effort by Congress to establish a
workable approach to the problem.^- Progressively, since 1939, when the Act of
Ijohn A. Pfiffner, Public Administration . New York: The Ronald Press,
I, P. 53
•
51921 was amended to establish the Executive Office of the President, the coordi-
nated skills of the executive agencies have improved in such matters as record
keeping, reporting, budget formulation, and controlled budget execution. The dis-
ruptive effects of World War II and the Korean Conflict have, of course, diluted
the quality of financial control, per se, but the methods through which such con-
trols are exercised have constantly improved, in general. This is believed to be
due, in part, to the cumulative effects of large scale employment in Government
of business men in both World Wars I and II, the Korean Conflict, and during the
Great Depression. It cannot be denied that the military managers and the business
managers always have had much to learn from each other, and it is further believec
that relatively continuous association of the two groups over this period has
seen great progress toward reconciliation of their views. Still further, it is
believed that a reasonably secure marriage of the interests of both could be
realized were it not for the multiple pressures exerted on them by the realities
of politics of all sorts which, at times, tend to frustrate their combined aims.
It is about these pressures and problems that the ensuing chapters are written.
No one who enters the field of military budget work should be unaware of these
inhibitions which are inherent in the puzzle of financial management of the
staggering sums of money with which they will be concerned.

CHAPTER II
MULTIPLE PRESSURES IN MILITARY BUDGETING
Congressional Pressures
One of the groups that displays great interest in the Military budget is
the Congress. Actually, the budget of the United States is classified as a joint
budget sponsored by Executive and Legislative Departments, The Executive prepares
it for Congress 1 consideration and the Congress enacts it into law and appro-
priates the money called for by the budget. Needless to say, memberships on the
Senate and House appropriations committees are powerful positions, and much of the
budget justification material presented in the course of Congressional hearings ia
tailored to reflect illustrative examples applicable to the constituencies of the
Congressmen sitting on the sub-committee conducting the hearings. While it might
be argued that this type of presentation is politically devised and misleading in
its intent, it is true that the budget becomes more understandable to the in-
quiring Congressman, when expressed in terms close to his own political interests.
Besides, there is the implied pressure by the Congressman, insofar as his
interests are concerned, that it would be inadvisable to recommend de-emphasis of
an aotivity located in his constituents' geographic area, even though general re-
ductions were the order of the day.
The obverse of the foregoing is also true. After a budget has progressed
through its formulation cycle and has been marked up—that is, tentatively re-
vised and resubmitted to the preparing agency for reclame proceedings—it is not
uncommon to distribute the reductions generously to the activities located within
the home areas of the Congressmen to whom the reclame justification is submitted.
Although this type of aotion could be considered unfair, it can be held that it
.
7is equally as fair as the method by which the overall reduction was established
by the appropriations committee. The word "reduction" is used as being synony-
mous with the words "mark up". Seldom, if ever, is the result of mark-up pro-
ceedings ether than a reduction. More often than not, the reasons advanced for a
reduction are vague and, seemingly, Bui £?rmfne; in fact, still more often, no
reason at all is given • Therefore, the above procedure is a natural reaction to
the very real, though implied, pressure of the Congressional committee members to
adopt a policy of laissez faire toward their interests.
Another type of Congressional pressure on military financial management
results from the groups of Congressmen travelling in connection with committee
work during adjournment each year. Invariably, there are public statements made
regarding military inefficiency in managing money, amongst other criticisms; and
these statements can seldom be challenged publicly by the Military organization
being called to task. An excellent example of this is offered currently^- in the
statements of a touring group of Congressmen who visited Spain and severely criti-
cized the Navy 1 s cost accounting requirements in connection with contracts for
work being performed on the United States bases in Spain. How a touring committee
could have made a sufficiently detailed examination of the records of such vast
efforts as are presently in progress in Spain seems subject to question; however,
a great amount of time and effort must now be devoted by the Navy to patiently
explain why the Navy uses the cost accounting method in question. In all proba-
bility, it will be found that the Navy is following an acceptable practice as
borne out by indications in the press,2 Conversely, the Air Force was praised
•^
-Washington Post and Times Herald . December 29, 195A, p. 1.
Washington Post and Times Herald . December 31, 1954, p. 5.

8for Its methods; and it is, again, questionable that the group could have made an
analysis that would substantiate its praise. While all of this makes excellent
copy for the people back home, the Military must take aotion to investigate the
charges and "take corrective action." Usually, the corrective action taken is a
report to the Congressman raising the question, and nothing further is heard on
the matter. However, the public is left with the impression that the Navy is not
doing a good job.
In contrast to the foregoing discussion, and as a matter of related and
timely Interest, the Navy has been criticized recently for insufficiently detailed
cost accounting by the Cooper Committee. Accordingly, the Navy is in the throes
of explaining why it doesn't require such detailed cost records as the Committee
seems to be convinced are required adequately to protect the public interest.
The extremes represented by these two examples must be satisfied, a feat of
leger-demain extremely difficult to accomplish.
Executive Pressures
The Executive Department, through the instrumentalities of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, the
Department of Defense and the three military departments, each year establishes
the criteria upon which the military budget is to be based. These statements of
policy are never published in time to permit orderly development of a budget
which will reflect that policy. Further, the policy itself, being derived at the
top of the organization with benefit of little advice from the field level, is
often very difficult to reconcile with the true needs of the field activities
which are ultimately affected by the policy. Thus, the pressure applied by the
Executive Department on itself, often results in a budget that does not reflect
the real requirements of the Executive Department. There is mute evidence of

9this in examples of sub-standard maintenance which results from such policy deter-
minations or uneconomic investment of maintenance funds when the budget for capi-
tal expenditures is not permitted to reflect actual need. As a matter of fact,
it may be argued successfully that the term "budget", as applied to the Nation's
financial plan, is a misnomer, since the budgetary requirements are, in a broad
sense, predetermined. This can hardly be accepted as sound budget practice; it
is something other than budgeting, in the generally accepted meaning of the term.
The lack of timely promulgation of criteria inhibits the very preparation
of the budget documents which are required. The lack of authority to state true
requirements further inhibits the quality of the financial plan. These two
pressures are perhaps the most difficult to comprehend and reconcile with the
earnest desires of those directly concerned with the accomplishment of the mission
of the Military.
The military budget is strongly affected by economic considerations. Even
in time of relatively peaceful conditions, public spending is one of the most im-
portant factors in the American economic system. The military spending consumes
more of the Public's funds than any other segment of the Federal Government and
constitutes approximately one-third of the aggregate demand for output of the
entire economy. 1 During a period of inflation, it is a widely accepted economic
principle to reduce public spending and apply tax revenues to reduction of the
Public Debt. During a period of depression, it is, likewise, a widely accepted
economic principle to increase public spending to stimulate the sagging economy,
ither of these considerations recognize the requirement for military protection,
matter how important it may be. It is recognized as altogether possible that
the total military requirement—if it were possible to firmly establish the total
^Arthur E. Burns, et al. Modern Economics . 2d Edit. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, Inc., 1953, p. 583.
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military requirement—simply cannot be afforded. This agonizingly difficult con-
sideration must be weighed by the Executive Department and the best possible
solution reached. Invariably, the solution represents a compromise between the
requirement and that which Is feasible of accomplishment. Further, it is not un-
common for Congress to suggest areas in which the Military should emphasize
spending in the interest of bolstering a particular segment of the economy. The
fiscal year 1955 budget included special provision for construction of housing at
military bases which the Military originally had not requested—this despite re-
ductions in maintenance money in other areas deemed necessary by the Military.
The amount specifically earmarked for this construction work was determined by
Congress.
Public Pressures
The general public must be reckoned with in the budgetary plans of the
Military. There are an infinite number of ways that this pressure may be fslt by
theMilitary, not the least of which is the Press. The number of editorials and
other newspaper articles which have had incremental effects on military budgets
cannot be counted. Much of this type of pressure stems from true expression of
public sentiment. An excellent example is found In the following account. It
had been determined after long study that it would be advisable to relocate a
naval activity from its present location in Port Rueneme, California to St. Louis,
Missouri. Port Rueneme is a very small town in a rural location in Southern
California. St. Louis is located in the state of the then President of the
United States. Despite the fact that there were contemplated large savings to
the Government, and operating advantages attendant to the proposed move, a
swelling tide of pressure commencing in Port Hueneme, spreading to surrounding
communities and finally to Los Angeles newspapers, finally resulted in active
Congressional interest. The pressure from Missouri in favor of the move was not
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great enough to overshadow that generated by the residents of a sleepy, little
town in California which drew a large amount of its support from the naval
activity concerned. Public pressure is real.
Local Command Pressures
It is not an unheard of situation that a local commanding offloer follows
a policy of requesting operating funds in excess of actual need, seeking to main-
tain bigness or expand his activity to enhance his prestige, or simply to permit
a relaxed, inefficient operation to proceed uninhibited by considerations of ef-
ficiency, necessity or the national interest. These objectionable operating
methods are inimical to the interest of the Navy, and, indirectly and adversely,
affect every other hardworking member and activity of the Navy. Intentional
overstatement of requirements through clever justification causes funds to be di-
verted from areas of need. One who has the task of preparing the local activity
budget under such conditions is operating under most difficult circumstances,
since he stands in danger of becoming a party to what amounts to dishonesty.
Fortunately, there are few who pursue such local policy) however, there are far
too many who, through lack of concern with, or knowledge of, what is going on,
cause the same result to occur. In the latter instance, to request the same
level of support as received tho previous fiscal year, without searching reap-
praisal of need, is almost as censurable as overt action to overstate requirements
Bureau of the Budget Pressures
The Bureau of the Budget has a tremendous task in carrying out its re-
sponsibility to produce an annual budget estimate for the United States Govern-
ment and to administer the appropriations which Congress has approved. The
problem of coordinating all of the multiple parts of the budget so that they will
flow to the Bureau in a manner to permit orderly review and hftiyTHng is an
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acutely difficult one. Therefore, of necessity, an organized, physically workable
plan^- for producing the budget document within the time limits imposed by Congress
must be employed. This plan is revised each year to reflect changes in require-
ments for information of the Bureau and Congress. While most of the pressure ex-
erted by the Bureau relates to the physical problem of supplying timely informa-
tion in the required format, there are other pressures which are encountered
during the process. After the Bureau of the Budget has conducted its review of
the Department's estimates, the estimates are returned with the indicated mark-
up2 for redevelopment of the estimates and/or reclama^ proceedings. Those con-
cerned with the basic task of redeveloping the information or developing the
reclame justification usually have an utterly inadequate length of time during
which to do so. This factor alone often discourages a Department from submitting
reolama justifications, since to do so requires the strongest possible facts to
support the request for reconsideration; and it takes time to develop a firm
justification.
Mr. Fercival F. Brundage^, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
describes the various considerations which a budget manager must take into account
to discharge his responsibility effectively. He states:
A third and still different approach to the budget process is that of a
manager. He realizes that the various segments of our economy rarely move in
one direction at the same time and with the same speed. His responsibility
is to keep the ship on an even keel and not allow the extremes in eigher di-
rection to dominate policy. He is forced to consider the expenditures first—
lu.S. Government, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget,
Instructions for Preparation and Submission of Annual Budget Estimates . Circular
A-ll, August 9, 1954
2Supra, p. 7
3The reclame is simply a method to permit rejustification of amounts which
may have been deducted during the course of review.
4p. F. Brundage, "A Critical Look at the Budget Process," Public Adminis-
tration Review . XIV Autumn 1954, pp. 247-52.
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the necessary and the desirable ones—and then to see how close he can come
to raising revenues enough to cover them. However, it is more important to
keep the economy going—on as stable a basis as possible and preferably with
a balanced budget. But he tries to keep the economy balanced whether or not
the budget is balanced. The psychological as well as the financial and eco-
nomic implications cf budget decisions he bel loves are becoming increasingly
important. When he comes to consider the defense budget and the foreign aid
program in particular, it is not the minimum amount that can be spent and
still carry out our programs that determines the decision. A good manager
has to provide reasonable protection for all of the known factors plus some
leeway for the unexpected. Yet he must come close enough to a balanced
budget, based in receipts computed under reasonable tax rates, to justify the
confidence of all of the different groups in the country.
Your representatives in the Budget Bureau must consider all of these dif-
ferent points of view, but it is the primary duty of a budget officer to
examine closely and rather skeptically all of the proposed expenditures of
the Government. In dealing with departments that have proposed programs for
new spending we must advance the conservative viewpoint of the businessman.
But we cannot unduly restrict research in new fields like atomic reactors and
guided missiles or improvements in public health services.
Obviously, the point of view expressed by the above quotation at times
Will not coincide closely with that of a military program for which funding is
sought before the Bureau of the Budget. The pressure exerted by the £ur«au to
reconcile the proposed program of expenditures to its concept of balance often
takes the form of arbitrary reductions. Sometimes, the Bureau can have no other
basis for making its reductions if the justification material submitted is unde-
niably sound—it can only evaluate all programs and make the soundest decision
consistent with the criteria which it is committed to follow. This was commented
upon by Leonard D. White when he wrote:
The role of the central budget officer in this area of policy and adminis-
tration has never been intimately described. It could be laid bare only by
the immediate participants and is perhaps too confidential to be fully re
vealed. It would be significant to know to what extent the United States
Bureau of the Budget influences substantive policy; to what extent it over-
rules, curtails, or amplifies agency programs, in what cases it acts without
consulting the President; when an agency feels warranted in appealing Bureau
decisions to the President (and why and with what success) ; to what extent
the initial recommendations of a budget examiner against a department pre-
vail; what strategy the departments employ to protect their estimates in the
Bureau? of the Budget and before the appropriations committees ; and what means
a President employs to protect his budget against attack or sabotage. Those
who know these mysteries do not reveal them.
The crucial issue is, on what grounds and on what evidence do budget
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officials approve, eliminate, or reduce proposals for expenditure. Budget
officers do not disclose specific reasons for rejecting or reducing an esti-
mate. In Washington, a phrase is current to the effect that a proposed ex-
penditure is not in harmony with the Presidents financial policy, a formula
which precludes discussion except with the President. The real reasons are
various, and are sometimes remote from fiscal considerations.
^
and:
Most budget experts assert that they have no policy except that which the;
receive from their principal. They are doubtless sincere in their opinion
that they are neutrals before great public issues, but acquaintance with them
quickly dispels any such illusion from the minds of their friends. They are
doubtless sincere also in asserting that they have no views on the usefulneee
of spending money here rather than there; but their daily decisions betray
them. This is not a criticism of budget experts, but a notice to those who
may have to deal with them.
2
Pressures from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense
Brief mention must be made at this point of the effects of the efforts
toward financial management of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the
annual budget process. Usually-, this Office conducts its military hearings and
reviews simultaneously with the Bureau of the Budget. This, of course, adds much
importance to the hearings at that level, since the military department represen-
tative making the presentation is subjected to the combined scrutiny of these
two important offices. The individuals who conduct these hearings are usually
men of academic ability and reasonably well-versed in the problems of the areas
under consideration. It behooves one to be well prepared to face these men for
it is reasonably certain that they will soon be able to form an opinion of the
soundness of the presentation being made. This, in itself, is a pressure that is
resulting in the development of greater skill and clarity in budget estimate pres-
entation work by the departments.
^Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration
.





There is also a negative pressure identifiable with this source and
closely associated with one mentioned in the foregoing discussion of the Bureau
of the Budget pressures.^- It relates to the reclama proceedings. Since the fina.
mark-up is achieved after a joint session with the Budget Bureau and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the reclama justification must be submitted to the same
joint group. This is a further discouragement against protesting the joint deci-
sion of these two high offices, and the writer is certain that many a reduction
has been accepted reluctantly, rather than to again submit to cross-examination
on a matter that probably has been discussed at length with the same people on a
previoue occasion. Even if one is successful in presenting an irrefutable justi-
fication, and the decision is reversed, it is not unlikely that the same, specific
points will be raised by the Congressional sub-committee during its later hearing
and review. It is believed that there is rather free exchange of information and
close cooperation by the representatives of the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, Bureau of the Budget, and the staffs of the Congressional sub-committees.
Parenthetically, this can produce an unbeatable combination, as far as the depart-
mental witness is concerned.
Military Department Pressures
It is quite possible that the pressure exerted upon the program budget
estimates of the bureaus and offices is greatest at the departmental level. The
hearings conducted at this level are, by far, the most exhaustive in their scope.
The mark-up of the estimates is far more detailed and reductions usually involve
greater sums of money than the mark-ups at higher levels. This is understandable
in view of the fact that each individual department is responsible for the sub-




document to be generated in the development of the estimates. There are bound to
be many errors and inconsistencies during this primary formulation phase. In the
Navy, the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy is responsible for this task, and
must undertake to bring into focus all of the component parts of the Navy ! s
budget estimates to form a cohesive document that is consistent, insofar as
possible, in all of its parts. It is at this point, also, that each program must
be analyzed to determine consistency in adherence to published criteria by all
bureaus and offices of the Department. Criteria may take the form of letters or
memoranda issued by the Bureau of the Budget, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and other h'gb officials. A well-
presented justification may fall due to failure to adhere to these criteria)
thus, the pressure of the Navy Comptroller's review is an important factor in as-
suring that the criteria are met.
It is through the Departmental Comptroller that most of the communica-
tions on budget policy, mark-ups, etc. , are received and, as a result, there is
frequent contact between that office and the bureau and office comptrollers. It
is at this level that the official records are maintained of the military depart-
ments' appropriations; as a consequence, there is further froquent contact over
the matter of appropriation accounting. Here, the closest scrutiny is exercised
over the obligations! rates being achieved by the bureaus and offices in order to
keep pace with important spending trends which may develop. Statistical analyses
are made of all parts of the Navy's financial picture to insure that the money is
being used properly and in the right places. The results of such studies provide
a basis for periodic review of the bureaus' and offices' spending plans in con-
nection with apportionment proceedings^ and also provide important information as
Government Printing Office, 1950.
^.S. Congress, House, P.L. 759, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 7786, Appro-
priation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 3@r 1951. Sec. 1211. Washington:
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regards the skill in financial management being exercised by the responsible
bureaus and offices. Expenditure and obligation analysis of this type ultimately
is utilized in the review of ensuing years' budget estimates and provides strong
bases for decision regarding the efficacy of the estimates. A wildly fluctuating
expenditure and obligation history will be no asset to one attempting to justify
an estimate before the Navy Comptroller.
General Pressure
There is one type of pressure which may be found to be common with most
of those mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter. There is barely
time enough in a twelve-month period to produce a budget estimate document In
time to peimit a reasonably orderly review by Congress. As a consequence, it is
not uncommon that determinations made by the Budget Bureau, which involve changes
in the estimates, are transmitted informally ; often, nothing in writing is seen
by the bureau or office responsible for effecting the revisions in the estimates
If, for example, an adjustment in appropriation cognizance over certain types of
expenses has been decreed by higher authority, it becomes necessary for two or
more bureaus and offices to change their estimates. Because of the informality
in transmitting such dicta, there have been too many instances where the informa-
tion has not reached all concerned. This can be particularly serious when the
downward adjustment is made by one bureau or office and the corresponding upward
adjustment is not effected by the bureau or office to which the appropriation cog
nizance and expenditure responsibility supposedly has been transferred.
A further objection to the informal method of transmitting highly impor-
tant budgetary information is found in the end result. If a bureau or office of
the Navy has stated its true requirements and has later received arbitrary re-
ductions, informally, and is forced, under the pressure of time, to revise its




sometimes oral, perhaps In a telephone conversation), the bureau or office af-
fected becomes the first to reduce anything to writing in the transaction and ap-
pears, thereby, to have originated the entire idea. The passage of time further
obscures what actually happened and, later, at times, has produced the rather
anomalous situation of the Bureau of the Budget inquiring into the reason why the
reduction was made by the bureau or office. Under such a circumstance, "strong
men weep."
Unfortunately, no improvement can be suggested in the method cited above
for transmittal of budgetary information. If it becomes necessary to reduce
every move to writing, the time required to produce the Military's budget would
be extended by months and would obviate the possibility of developing an annual
budget within the time limits required by the Congress. Fortunately, there are
few instances which can be called to mind where anything more serious than con-
fusion of information has been experienced in this method of transmitting
important information. The great majority of those involved in this intricate
process of military budgeting are able, serious-minded men, anxious to do the
right thing.
The pressures applied to the military budget, are, indeed, multiple in
their scope and variety. The Congress; the Executive Office of the President and
all of its high advisory staffs; the general public; the Office of the Secretary
of Defense; the bureaus and offices—in the case of the Navy Department, the
local field activity command—all have a variety of interests to be served, and
all bring whatever pressure lies at their hands to realize their respective aspi-
rations and objectives. To not be aware of these realities would be most naive





SPECIAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN
MILITARY BUDGET WORK
While there are numerous sources of pressure which complicate the process
of military budget work, there are also a number of unsolved problems inherent in
the task which one engaged in this type of work must learn to live with. A few
of these problems are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Common Format—Its Deceptions
It is generally conceded that no one person, or, for that matter, no one
agency, is capable of comprehending the colossus that lies behind the budget of
the United States. Congress recognizes this and appoints special groups for ap-
propriation sub-committees to examine segments of the budget. For simplicity f s
sake, probably, the budget document is prepared in a single prescribed format
specified by the Bureau of the Budget, whether the object of a particular seg-
ment of the budget is to provide for maintenance and operating expenses for the
Bureau of Ordnance of the United States Navy or for the Soil Conservation Serv-
ice of the Department of Agriculture. When these two widely divergent efforts
are expressed in terms of common format of the budget, their significant differ-
ences become partially obscured to the reviewing appropriations sub-committee
and those conducting other high level reviews. The brevity which is prescribed
for narrative justifications often causes inadvertant concealment of significant
facts—significant to the preparing agency striving adequately to explain its
program. The near-perfection of the composition of the narrative justifications
by the time that they have been edited and re-edited several times also carries
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its own deceptions—it*s simply too pat. It is the opinion of the writer that
too many of those reviewing the document lose the awareness that the budget docu-
ment is, at best, a thumbnail sketch of the functions to be financed. The ob-
scuring of identity of the programs by the time they have reached Congress for
review would seem to render much of the proceedings but annual ritual, rather
than a searching review of actual requirements. The late and revered James V.
Forrestal epitomizes this view in the following quotation:
Even a single one of the armed services, like the Navy, is so big and
sprawling during war, that it becomes unresponsive and unwieldy under highly
centralized direction. This defect would treble, at least, if the Army,
Navy, and Air Force were rolled together. No single head of such an agglom-
eration could assemble, assimilate, and assess the data he would need to make
a multitude of administrative decisions. Nor could he build a staff numerous
enough to police his decisions once they were made.-*-
Add to the Army, Navy and Air Force, all of the other agencies of the
Government and consider how unlikely it is that their financial requirements,
alone, could be adequately reviewed and compiled by a single agency into one,
meaningful document. Yet, the very submission of a budget document in common
format would lead the reviewing authority to believe that it has been done, and,
further, that the Budget Bureau knows the full significance of the contents of the
document.
While it is true that the Bureau of the Budget knows a great deal about
the budget, it cannot know the budget in the same sense that the controller of a
corporation is expected to be intimately familiar with the operating programs
represented by the budget of his concern. The same general criticism might be
applied to the departmental budgets and those whose duty it is to compile, pre-
sent and defend them before the Secretary of Defense, the Budget Bureau, and the
Congress. The field operating personnel seldom have the opportunity to defend
Salter Millis and Eugene S. Duffield (eds.), The Forrestal Diaries . New
York: Viking Press, Inc., 1951.
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their programs, except through the medium of submissions from the field of ac-
tivity budget estimates. Administrative personnel in Washington take over the
task of presentation and defense, frequently making important revisions in the
field estimates without the knowledge or advice of the field activity. In some
instances, maintenance and operating expense budgets are prepared in Washington
without reference to the field activities concerned!
But, irrespective of the variety of approaches to budgeting which are
blended into the final document, it is reasonably certain that the format, at
least, will be consistent.
The Transition in Budget Office
Personnel Staffing
Section 4X33, Title IV of Public Law Number 216, Eighty-first Congress,
specified that the function of Comptrollership would be established in each of
the military departments under an Assistant Secretary and, further, that the
function would be established in field activities wherever appropriate. The
The Navy, in its implementation directive, included the following statement:
When officers occupy the comptroller position, it is considered highly
desirable that a civilian assistant be assigned in the comptroller organiza-
tions in order to provide specialized knowledge and continuity to the conduct
of comptroller functions.
^
As a consequence of this expression of policy, there has been an ex-
panding employment of civilian personnel in top supervisory budget positions at
field and bureau and office levels. Comparatively, there are few naval officer
personnel and virtually no enlisted personnel engaged in this work at the present
time, and the majority of those who are so employed are usually employed in staff
capacities. The unattractive features of this development are obvious to the
"operator" type of naval officer, and have resulted in a shying away from billets
in the field of Comptrollership. It appears that the dynamic part of the field
1U.S. Government, Department of the Navy, SBCNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.4,
18 November 1953, p. 7.
.
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of Comptrollership has been virtually removed from the province of naval person-
nel, with certain outstanding senior billet exceptions highlighting this
observation.
The serious nature of the personnel staffing problem is this. With the
number of qualified naval officers spread so thinly across the field of Navy
budget work, insufficient naval thinking is going into the budget. Further, too
many of the highly placed civilian personnel, particularly at departmental level,
have little or no substantive experience at the field operating level in the
Navy, and, hence, have little in the way of practical knowledge to permit them to
perform their work from the standpoint of the Navy. This has resulted, in part,
from the free transfer of personnel that is encouraged by Civil Service regula-
tions applicable to those employed in the Departmental service. A resultant
"cross-breeding" of budget supervisory personnel has occurred to a remarkable
degree.
The desired continuity sought by the Navy through employment of civilian
personnel in top level budget positions cannot be said to have been realized.
Few remain in their jobs for very long periods, even at the very top, due to fre-
quent opportunities to improve their respective lots elsewhere. To a somewhat
lesser extent, this is also found to be true in the field. At lower grade
levels, persons of outstanding ability and promise usually find that they can
improve their opportunities faster by taking employment in Industry. Their time
in Civil Service serves them well by providing a relaxed period of training at an
excellent beginning wage, but no material continuing contribution is made to the
Navy which hopefully employs and trains them. Repeated instances of bitter disap-
pointment lie ahead for the neophyte when he comes face to face with this acute
problem, for, if he has acquired a young, excellent assistant comptroller, he
will be fortunate to retain his services for an appreciable length of time.
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The Constant Problem of Change
The last broad problem that will be discussed relates to the high degree
of vulnerability of the Military to frequent change. One of the greatest prob-
lems which must be faced is that the Profession of Arms is open to repeated scru-
tiny from so many sources that it is nearly impossible to maintain a consistent
modus operandi without frequent and great changes being imposed in a variety of
ways. In the field of budget work, this is multiplied, since it is one of the
more vulnerable fields, not being veiled in the mystery of nuclear fission,
guided missiles, electronics, and many other fields which enjoy relative "diplo-
matic immunity".
As a result of the efforts of the Hoover Commission, the Performance
Budget1 concept was established and this resulted in a complete change in the ap-
propriation structure for the Navy and a completely new concept of budgeting.
Forthwith, the Navy, as well as the other military departments, was called upon
to learn a new system. This is not an easy task in an organization the size of
the United States Navy, and is still not complete. Attendant to this revision in
budgeting was a complete alteration in the Navy's accounting systenr to conform
to the new appropriation structure and to meet the requirements for budgetary in-
formation under the new method. However, in this instance, the change is
believed to have been vitally necessary.
Another group, convened at the request of the Secretary of Defense, known
as the Cooper Committee, has recently completed its study of the accounting meth-
ods employed by the military departments, and important recommendations for
^kl.S. Congress, House. P.L. 216, 8lst Cong., Amend, to Natl. Security Act
1947, Sec. 403, Title IV. Washington: Govt. Ptg. Office, 1949.
^U.S. Congress, House. P.L. 784, 8lst Cong, 2d Sess., Budgeting
counting Procedures Act of 1950 . Washington: Govt. Ptg. Office, 1950.
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change are certain to result from its findings. A new Hoover Commission study is
in the offing, and still other changes in all probability will be forthcoming.
Many of the changes recommended to be effected in the Military's budget
and accounting methods are either necessary or desirable, and it is encouraging
to observe so many public-spirited, eminently well-qualified citizens striving to
perfect these methods in the Military. However, the writer long has believed that
there always has been sufficient intellect, ability, initiative, and appreciation
of this need within the Military to develop appropriate ways and means of doing
things; however, the continued availability of sufficient numbers of trainable
or trained conscientious civilian and military personnel to execute plans has
been sadly lacking. There are plenty of personnel, but too many seem to know
that they do not have to be highly efficient to hold their jobs unless they so
desire. The earnest hard worker seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
Further, the ceilings of both civilian and military personnel have been subjected
to continuous, and sometimes wild, fluctuation imposed since the close of World
War II by those who would insist on increased efficiency. Even now, newly re-
vised military personnel objectives will further militate against reaching a peri-
od of relative normalcy in staffing for the next year or more, let alone invoking
sweepingly new methods of whatever sort. Hov, then, under these conditions, can
appreciably increased efficiency be expected? It seems strange that such fru-
strating problems as these are not recognized in their proper sequence—it would
appear that solutions to personnel staffing problems would be among the foremost
of recommendations by investigating groups. It seems irrefutable that the right
people to do a job must be secured if the job is to be done successfully.
There are several groups who are required to keep an official eye on what
the Military does—the General Accounting Office; the Inspectors General; the
Boards of Analysis and Review—and the objectives of all must be served.
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Needless to say, then, there axe divers inroads made on the time of those
in the Military who are attempting to do the job of budgeting and accounting.
Nevertheless, these inroads are the normal expectation, rather than the exception
to the rule. Many others have not been mentioned, but those indicated above will
give the reader an idea of an inherent problem in budget work which will probably
never be solved. An inordinately large amount of one's time is devoted to telling
all of these interested parties what is being done or changing methods to conform
to their ideas of how it should be done.
Summary
Again, it is desired to emphasize that the citation of the problems men-
tioned above is not to be construed primarily as criticism, but rather, it is
intended to recognize the problems which must be met and dealt with as a matter
of course.
One should not be misled by the format of the budget to believe it is an
all-inclusive, infallible source of information on the Military's financial re-
quirements. It is not, and cannot be; however, the requirements of the Govern-
ment must be stated in some manner so that they can be acted upon by Congress in
a reasonably organized, reasonably complete approach. The method now in use
probably is the best yet devised.
In entering the field of budget work, one should realize the problems of
personnel staffing and that the theories and practices encountered do not neces-
sarily coincide.
Outside experts are always with us, and always will be. From them will
be derived many long-range benefits, while a great deal of time will also be de-
voted to dealing with them. Much of the time invested in these efforts will seem










Anyone who devotes concerted effort to thinking ahout the process of
military budgeting, and the inherent pressures and problems of that field of en-
deavor, is bound to reach some personal conclusions regarding improvements which
can and should be made. The writer is no exception and feels that there are cer-
tain improvements which could be made to simplify the overall task without the
necessity for a complete revision in methodology. Most of the suggested areas
for improvement will probably be considered trite, so frequently are they ad-
vanced as suggested, partial cures for deficiencies found in virtually any type
of administrative work in the Military. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to
label these suggestions as continuing needs.
A Ceiling on the Cost of Costing
During the course of the first six months of the curriculum of the Navy
Graduate Comptrollership Program, George Washington University, 195A-1955, nu-
merous comptrollers from Industry have informed the student officers on many
phases of the businesses they represent. A frequent question put to these gentle-
men has concerned the ratio of investment in comptrollership expense to the over-
all budget. In the majority of instances, the replies were responsive and
definite—the costs of all functions performed by these comptrollers range from
five to ten percent of the annual operating expense budgets. In contrast to
this, it is doubtful that any agency of the Government, including the Bureau of
the Budget, knows the full costs incurred in the budget and accounting processes.
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Paul Haase, in a brief article1 , estimates that thirty million dollars is in-
vested in the Federal budget drafting process, alone. If capital expenditures
were excluded from the total Federal budget, it is believed that the percentage
of the remainder, maintenance and operating expenses, devoted to budget and ac-
counting costs would prove to be a staggeringly high percentage in comparison
with Industry's experience.
It would be virtually impossible, for instance, to estimate the cost of
special record keeping developed to avoid punishment specified by law for over-
obligation or over-expenditure of appropriated funds. It is a fact that an
over-obligation or over-expenditure of one cent must be reported to the Secretary
of the Department, via all intermediate commands, bureaus and offices, naming the
responsible officer or officers. This stiflingly rigid requirement is costing an
untold amount for special controls; yet, the basic reason for its establishment
probably seemed important to the appropriations committees and Congress—it must
have, for a fine of $5,000 and two years in prison is stipulated for conviction
of guilt. * While, to the knowledge of the writer, no one has been prosecuted
pursuant to this provision of law, many official reports of trivial violations of
the letter of the law have been observed. An allotment administrator in the
field will go a long way to insure that he will not have to report himself to the
Secretary of his department. And he does. It is believed to be vitally neces-
sary that some method be devised, utilizing the existing accounting and reporting
system, to discover what it is costing the Government, and the Military in
^-Paul Haase, "$30 Million Just to Draft Budget", The Controller.
February 1954., p. 57.
2U.S. Congress, House, P.L. 759, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 7786, Sec.
1211, Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Y>ar ending June 30. 1951 . Washington
i




particular, to carry out its responsibilities in the field of budget and account-
ing. This could lead to the establishment of standards for such administrative
type costs.
A Management Survey
There are many qualified management engineering personnel employed in the
Government and the Military today. In addition, there are a number of competent
firms of management consultants capable of conducting large-scale surveys. Such
a survey is sorely needed, today, in the Federal Government's budget and account-
ing field, not for the purpose of completely revising the methods in use, but for
the purpose of work simplification. Such a survey could commence with the
obvious, glaring faults of the present budget system. It is almost certain that,
if Congress knew what it was costing in overtime and its attendant wastes to meet
its time schedule, i.e., submission of the budget to Congress in early January,
Congress would change its information requirements. To verify this contention,
all the reader needs to do is drive past the Pentagon on any evening or weekend
after the Bureau of the Budget has issued another of its emergency calls for in-
formation. This scene is repeated all over Washington wherever a Government
bureau or office budget agency is located. Due to original delays in publishing
criteria or other necessary guidance, practically all budget information is pre-
pared on an emergency or near-emergency basis.
It would be necessary for a selected group of highly competent Government
and private comptrollers and accountants to work with such a management methods
survey group. It is believed that such a survey would inevitably lead to an
analysis of the basic budget methods and requirements for information specified
by the Bureau of the Budget and what must be done at all lower echelons to meet
those requirements. It would be very interesting, for instance, to discover what
substantive use is made of the reams of schedules which must be prepared pursuant
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to the Budget Bureau's requirements, and what it is costing to prepare them.
Until a recent reorganization within the Bureau of the Budget, the respon-
sibility for overall improvement in administrative methods in the Government has
rested with a special section uf that Bursau. Each major division is now respon-
sible for its own program of methods improvement. Therefore, this suggestion
would probably have to be implemented by a commission similar to the Hoover
Commission.
The scope of the survey to be conducted would, necessarily, be required to
be strictly and clearly limited, for there would be the constant possibility of
such a survey going off on a tangent. It is believed that the work of such a
group could be confined to Washington and the near vicinity. It is also believed
that a great deal of the information developed by the Hoover Commission task
forces and the Cooper Committee would obviate a great deal of effort that might
otherwise be required. Such a survey might well result in a significant simpli-
fication and improvement in budget and accounting methods.
A Re-Assessment of the Personnel Policies
in the Field of Military Budgeting
It is believed that the trend toward preponderant civilian staffing of the
budget offices in the Military is a mistake. To those who do not think in a mili-
tary way, or who work in an atmosphere which is predominantly civilian rather than
military, the budget on which they work tends to become an end in itself—a mere
compilation of numbers—an academic problem. A greater incidence of military per-
sonnel engaged in this effort would go far toward preventing inexperienced, though
technically competent, thought from pervading the budget document produced.
A more important aspect of personnel policy deserves attention. While the
majority of those working on the preparation of the military budget are civilian,
the ultimate responsibility for the adequacy of that budget attaches itself to the
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Military, alone . To illustrate, who was blamed for the inadequate defense of
Pearl Harbor? The Presidents then current and past? The legions of Congressmen
who had all had a part in the reductions in the military readiness to its woe-
fully inadequate state in 1941? Departmental civilians? The ultimate effects of
military budget mistakes often take years for their full force and effect to be
known, and when the finger of scorn is pointed, the incumbent military leaders
must resignedly divide up the responsibility for all past blunders and bear the
shame. It is a cardinal principle in management that authority and respons-
bility must accompany each other, and if the responsibility for the protection of
the United States rests with the Military, the reasonable means of authority
should accompany that assignment. However, outside, and seemingly outrageous,
interferences with personnel staffing prerogatives and attendant necessary mis-
assignment of administrative authority to civilians is debilitating the exercise
of that authority. It is believed that this anomalous situation is the result of
an historic lack of understanding by higher authorities of the true meaning of
the principle of civilian control of the Military. Civilian control does not
mean civilian staffing.^- Yet, there has been an inexorable trend since 1947
toward maximum civilian staffing of the highest echelons of the military depart-
ments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This has taken place to a
higher degree in the predominantly administrative type tasks, such as budget and
accounting work, where military personnel are few and far between.
It is a fair surmise that it is costing the taxpayers too much to develop
the Federal budget and to account for the expenditure of public funds, because
^-Eugene S. Duffield, "Organizing for Defense", Harvard Business Review
.
September-October 1953, pp. 29-42.
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this cost has never been established. The field of budget and accounting, for
this partial reason, is an administrative windfall to some, since, for lack of
control, it provides almost unlimited opportunity for empire building. The man-
agement survey suggested would probably unearth some excellent examples of this,
and would contribute extensively to reduced costs in the important administrative
area of budget and accounting work. Likewise, a frank reappraisal of personnel
policies could be productive of intangible benefits in the form of more meaning-
ful budgeting as a result of a greater incidence of military thinking in the





It Is again desired to reiterate that the purpose of this paper is to
highlight the pressures and problems which are inherent in budget work, particu-
larly in the Navy. Hundreds of pages would be required adequately to analyze the
subject matter discussed herein and the suggestions for improvement advanced.
Some of the statements made are generalizations and are believed to be factual,
though difficult to substantiate except through personal experience and in the
light of personal opinion.
Despite some practices which are frustratingly difficult to deal with, it
is also believed that there has been a continuing general improvement in budget
and accounting methods, at least as far as the Navy is concerned. This has been
due, in part, to improved guidance and direction from the Bureau of the Budget,
improved coordination and methods within the Navy through the combined efforts of
the Office of the Navy Comptroller and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and
development of skills of individuals.
It is of utmost importance that this trend be continued and that every
avenue for improvement be explored. An awareness of the pressures and problems
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